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Abstract
Why, when confronted with policy alternatives that could improve patient care, public health and
the economy, does Congress neglect those goals and tailor legislation to suit the interests of
pharmaceutical corporations? In brief, for generations, the pharmaceutical industry has
convinced legislators to define policy problems in ways that protect its profit margin. It
reinforces this framework by selectively providing information and by targeting campaign
contributions to influential legislators and allies. In this way, the industry displaces the public’s
voice in developing pharmaceutical policy. Unless citizens mobilize to confront the political
power of pharmaceutical firms, objectionable industry practices and public policy won’t change.
Yet we need to refine this analysis. I propose a research agenda to uncover pharmaceutical
influence. It develops the theory of dependence corruption to explain how the pharmaceutical
industry is able to deflect the broader interests of the general public. It includes empirical studies
of lobbying and campaign finance to uncover the means drug firms use to: 1) shape the policy
framework adopted and information used to analyze policy; 2) subsidize the work of political
allies; and 3) influence Congressional voting.
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The point, for the 946,326th time is that people get elected to office by currying the favor of
powerful interest groups. They don't get elected for their excellence as political philosophers.1

Congress has consistently failed to solve some serious problems with the cost,
effectiveness, and safety of pharmaceuticals. In part, this failure results from the pharmaceutical
industry convincing legislators to define policy problems in ways that protect industry profits.
By targeting campaign contributions to influential legislators and by providing them with
selective information, the industry manages to displace the public’s voice in developing
pharmaceutical policy.

Pharmaceuticals and Political Money
The pharmaceutical industry is a major player in United States elections. Individuals
working for pharmaceutical manufacturers and sometimes the firms themselves donate money
directly to candidates, political parties, and political action committees (PACs), and the industry
also funds outside spending organizations or spends this money separately from the candidate or
political party (e.g., independent expenditures in the form of television advertisements).
Published accounts have pharmaceutical manufacturers spending a grand total of $21.3 million
on federal elections in 2012, which is 407 percent more than the 1990 inflation-adjusted total.
The peak in real spending, however, was reached in 2002, when that same amount was 549
percent more than the 1990 inflation-adjusted total. 2 Most of this money goes to incumbents, to
those in the majority party, and to those who sit on Congressional committees important to the
industry—a pattern entirely consistent with the intention of seeking legislative favors.3
Pharmaceutical manufacturers and individual employees of these corporations contribute
predominantly to the Republican Party (although with some notable exceptions), especially when
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it holds a majority in either the House of Representatives or the Senate. In 1990, 65 percent of
the industry’s Senate contributions went to Republicans (the majority party) and 44 percent of its
House contributions went to Republicans (the minority party). By 1996, the first election cycle
after the Republicans became the House majority; donations to House Republicans increased to
70 percent and remained above that level in 2002 and 2004, the electoral cycles bracketing the
2003 Medicare Modernization Act. Democrats captured slightly over 50 percent of this
industry’s contributions in 2008, the election cycle leading to the Affordable Care Act (ACA),
but the percentage dropped to 39 percent in 2012, the first election after Republicans regained
the House majority in 2010. Regardless of party affiliation, the pharmaceutical industry donated
most of its money to incumbents—never less than 74 percent from 1990 to 2012.4 The industry
also donates large sums to Congressional leadership and committee chairs.
A member or candidate’s party affiliation and that party’s majority/minority status
explain most of the variation in this industry’s Congressional donations.5 In 2012, the average
contribution to a Republican House member was $21,280 ($16,708 for Democrats), but Fred
Upton (R-MI), chairman of the Energy and Commerce committee, got $173,865. Of the top
recipients, many are in the Congressional leadership and all received over $90,000: John
Boehner (R-OH), Eric Cantor (R-VA), Steny Hoyer (D-MD), Kevin McCarthy (R-CA), and
James Clyburn (D-SC). Also included among these top recipients are Senators Orrin Hatch (RUT), Scott Brown (R-MA), and Robert Menendez (D-NJ), who all received more than $150,000,
well above the Republican and Democrat Senator averages of $28,202 and $34,760,
respectively.6
But in fact, published totals almost certainly underestimate actual spending, either by
ignoring money donated to state-level committees (such as the Republican Governors
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Association) or by missing industry donations due to inconsistent reporting in campaign finance
records.7 After correcting for these problems in the 2012 data, I found an additional $9 million
in contributions from pharmaceutical manufacturers. Of all industry donations, 65 percent
supported Republicans and 26 percent supported Democrats directly.8 The Republican
advantage in state-level and outside spending (e.g., money spent on television advertisements
separate from the political parties or candidates) drove the overall advantage, with three-quarters
of industry money going to Republicans.

Money Well Spent in Setting the Policy Agenda
History suggests that all this money was well spent. The pharmaceutical industry is very
profitable and its profits depend in large part on several industry-specific federal policies. In a
nutshell, the federal government actively provides drug firms with very profitable patent
protection and market exclusivity for new products, while refusing to set any controls on prices
as a condition for those advantages. In the 1980s, for example, pharmaceutical corporations
received a boost from the Bayh-Dole Act and the Hatch-Waxman Act, which allowed them to
acquire patents on drugs produced through research funded by the National Institutes of Health.
Hatch-Waxman also increased the length of biotechnological patents.9 There were no
corresponding constraints on prices passed at the time.
The advantages granted to the industry are meant to promote a public good—
development of medications to reduce suffering and death. In reality, the industry has corrupted
the system so that, in several ways, the system now subverts the public good. Pharmaceutical
firms have learned how to make huge profits with drugs that do not much improve public health
and that sometimes are unsafe or are prescribed without need.10
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The industry has also ensured that prices are kept abnormally high. Most of the market
share for drug purchases is not subject to price controls even though pharmaceutical spending
would be one-tenth of what it is now if all purchases were priced as generics.11 American
consumers cannot buy less-expensive drugs imported from other countries, and Medicare, which
sets prices for other medical products and services, cannot set drug prices. Price-control policy
ideas exist and are not far-fetched, but Congress maintains the current patent system even though
Pharmaceutical corporations can hold patents—and charge accordingly high prices—for minor
variations on existing drugs (so-called me-too drugs).12
A substantial line of analysis suggests that the current patent system does not result in the
innovation it was intended to produce and that the cost of funding clinical trials could be
supported through alternative incentives such as awarding prizes for important therapeutic
innovations.13 From 1993 to 2004, R&D costs doubled for pharmaceutical firms and for the
National Institutes for Health, while the number of priority reviews of new molecular designs
fell.14 Pharmaceutical firms have little incentive to create path-breaking drugs, even with federal
subsidies, because they can earn such handsome profits at much lower risk by developing me-too
drugs. It is more profitable for manufacturers to “maximize the value of their patent monopolies,
by increasing the length of patent protection” and by increasing sales through over-marketing,
paying doctors to switch products, and skewing knowledge of drug risks and benefits.15 The
writing was on the wall nearly 40 years ago, when economist M.J. Murray wrote:
Criticism of the pharmaceutical industry has intensified, focusing on restrictive patent
regulation, ineffective products, duplicative marketing procedures, misrepresentative
advertising, overpricing, noncompetitive pricing, and the ill effects of many drug lines
owing to insufficient research and ineffective quality control. Yet these features …
cannot be fully understood without an analysis of the structure of the industry and the
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actual locus of power…At present, the stability of the pharmaceutical industry rests on its
high rate of profit.16

These issues persist in part because Congress shuns policy alternatives.

What Could Have Been? The Legislative Victories for the Pharmaceutical Industry
Political scientist Thomas Ferguson has proposed his own version of the Golden Rule:
“To discover who rules, follow the gold.”17 For over 50 years, there have been attempts to make
the pharmaceutical industry more responsive to the public welfare. These attempts have largely
failed. Who rules indeed?
While Senator Estes Kefauver (D-TN) was chairing the 1959-1961 hearings on the
pharmaceutical industry, he became the main architect of a bill that would subject
pharmaceutical corporations to antitrust lawsuits and redesign patents in order to foster more
competition and reduce prices.18 These economic reform efforts failed, although Congress did
enact drug safety legislation after the Thalidomide scandal in the early 1960s. This pattern was
repeated in the early to mid-1990s, when the Clinton administration proposed the Health Security
Act, which included an advisory council that would provide input on the appropriate price point
the government would pay for new drugs, comparing each drug to others in its therapeutic class
and using variables such as manufacturing cost while excluding advertising expenditures. The
House of Representatives never voted on the bill.19
In 2003, the House attempted to reduce drug prices by passing the Pharmaceutical Access
Act, which would have allowed individuals or retailers in the U.S. to purchase drugs in foreign
countries for much lower prices than the same drugs were sold for in the U.S. The
pharmaceutical industry opposed the bill, claiming that it is unsafe to import drugs from other
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countries and that the transportation of pills during the re-importation process could cause their
potency to diminish. They also argued that drug prices needed to be high so that firms would
have an incentive to invest in research.20 These arguments held sway in large part because they
were supported with political money. Evidence shows that the coalition to block drug reimportation received more cash than the coalition to allow re-importation and that the industry
used campaign contributions to reward or punish each representative’s vote.21 The bill never
became law. While other factors—such as being in a border state and having a high percentage
of senior citizens in a district—can partially explain who voted for and against re-importation,
pharmaceutical industry campaign contributions are the more important explanatory variable.22
The 2003 Medicare Modernization Act added an outpatient prescription drug benefit to
Medicare, a reform that Democrats had sought since the 1990s. The bill, championed by a
Republican president and a Republican majority in Congress, did not include the price control
mechanisms that had been part of previous Democrat bills.23 Analysis of campaign contributions
and lobbying contacts show significant “hard money donations to Senators’ election campaigns”
in both the 2002 and 2004 electoral cycles from groups that favored the bill.24 By 2009-2010,
the Democratic Party took notice and avoided major conflict with the industry, which proved
fruitful for its members’ campaign coffers.25 Pharmaceutical corporations had again averted a
threat to high drug prices and profits.
When Congress started drafting the bills for health care reform that became the ACA,
control of drug prices was not on the agenda. But to ensure that it stayed off the agenda, the
pharmaceutical-manufacturing industry increased its lobbying budget nearly 15 percent to
$185.5 million.26 One recent study forecasting pharmaceutical business after the ACA expects
pharmaceutical profits to rise because of expanded coverage without price controls.27
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Taken together, this string of victories for the pharmaceutical industry socialized its costs
and privatized its benefits—so much so that, by 2004, there was a public backlash.28 Some states
used lawsuits to reduce Medicaid drug prices, while insurance companies offered patients
financial incentives to choose generics rather than branded drugs. Nevertheless, the main
industry-serving features of American pharmaceutical policy remained in place.29
Today, there are several detailed, well-researched policy solutions to high drug prices, the
development of me-too drugs, unethical conduct in clinical trials, selective disclosure of clinicaltrial data, and payments to doctors for prescribing certain drugs. These problems are exacerbated
by the medical community’s dependence on pharmaceutical corporations for funding.30 Most
reform plans to resolve these and other problems involve new legislation, or a change in legal
enforcement and administration so that trade-offs between profit maximization and public health
are not as stark. Proposals such as economist Dean Baker’s plan for public funding of clinical
trials,31 do not advance as legislation, largely because of industry funding of electoral campaigns
and lobbying.32

Redressing Political Power by Expanding the Scope of Conflict
Why, when confronted with plausible policy alternatives that could improve lives, save
money for consumers, and reduce federal spending, does Congress repeatedly choose to maintain
the status quo or tailor legislation to advance the interests of pharmaceutical corporations? This
question raises issues for political participation and representation. James Madison addressed
the motivation for political participation among economic interests in The Federalist:
A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with
many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into
different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these
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various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and
involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the
government. 33

Since a primary task of legislation is to regulate among these various and interfering interests it
is inevitable that interested parties would be involved in making and passing such legislation.
Today, interested parties exercise the spirit of party and faction by lobbying, funding policy
research (for example, in think tanks), and making campaign contributions; that is, by injecting
their own information, ideas, and money into the legislative process. While voters can always
vote, wealthy people and profitable industries have these additional ways to influence what
government does and what it leaves alone.34
According to political scientist E. E. Schattschneider’s scope of conflict theory, policy
change in a democracy is “determined by the scope of public involvement in conflicts.”35
Political actors use the language of policy rhetoric to narrow or expand the number and type of
decision-makers; in other words, to expand what they see as necessary and rightful government
intervention or to prevent or roll back what they see as unwarranted or counterproductive
government intervention. They use terms such as free market, capitalism, and private property
to keep certain decisions out of the public’s—that is, the government’s—hands, while terms such
as public health, equality, and justice are meant to put certain decisions into the public’s hands
rather than leave them to private individuals or corporations.36
Schattschneider was optimistic that democratic government, made up of competitive and
responsible political parties, could expand conflict—or, as he put it, socialize conflict—in order
to solve important economic and social questions. However, he noted, “the effectiveness of
democratic government as an instrument for the socialization of conflict depends on the
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amplitude of its powers and resources.”37 Government should be able to provide a space for
conflict that protects actors from retaliation, but to do that takes a political party with resources.
The motives of those who supply the party with those resources are important because
political parties prioritize conflicts and formulate policy alternatives. As Schattschneider
observed, “the definition of the alternatives is the supreme instrument of power.”38 Put another
way, if you are paying the people who solve social problems, you may have a say in deciding
what gets called a social problem. If you are a pharmaceutical company, you might not want to
define inflated prices, opaque safety testing, and a lack of innovation as social problems. Thus, it
is possible that a resource-dependent party will not be able to socialize conflict—to bring it more
into the realm of public rather than private/corporate decision making.
Schattschneider was not shy when it came to blaming political leaders and political
organizations for failures in American democracy, but he never explained exactly why they
failed. Public policymaking related to pharmaceuticals is certainly rife with failure and is,
indeed, a good place to examine whether the competitive two-party system has failed to produce
the socialization of conflict that Schattschneider thought necessary for change and, if so, why it
has failed. The answers can be found in this critique of pharmaceutical policy:
The sort of thoroughgoing changes required will take government action, which in turn
will require strong public pressure. It will be tough. Drug companies have the largest
lobby in Washington, and they give copiously to political campaigns. Legislators are
now so beholden to the pharmaceutical industry that it will be exceedingly difficult to
break its lock on them.39
There is no question that our political leaders depend on resources from the pharmaceutical
industry—cash while campaigning and information (providing through lobbying) while
governing. But we need to develop this critique in a more sophisticated way.
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Dependence Corruption and Policymaking: A Theoretical and Empirical Agenda
I propose an agenda that would provide (a) a theoretical framework (dependence
corruption) with which to view pharmaceutical political power and (b) two empirical projects to
document links between political money and pharmaceutical policy.
Theoretical agenda
The dependence corruption framework posits that that a political system over-reliant on
the pharmaceutical industry will cater to the needs of the industry while disregarding the public’s
needs and values. While the study of individual corruption focuses on nepotism, bribery, and
other law-breaking behavior, the study of dependence corruption focuses on the way particular
economic and political relations can cause moral and political decline. It brings the role of
political money to the forefront.
This framework recalls eighteenth-century definitions of corruption.40 Diverse thinkers
such as Adam Smith and Jean-Jacques Rousseau all saw corrupting influences occurring at the
societal level and, accordingly, saw that “corruption was not so much an individualized breach of
duties as a condition that spread contagiously and diffusely throughout the polity affecting
leaders and citizens alike.”41 The corrupting influence on an institution can vary by legitimacy
and importance. When a less-than-legitimate influence becomes more important than others, it
can cause an institution to deviate from its intended purpose, and this process/phenomenon is
called dependence corruption. It is important not to define the health of U.S. representative
democracy by the presence or absence of quid pro quo corruption, because outright bribery is
unnecessary in order for money to influence policy.
In 1932, political scientist Louise Overacker pondered the possibility of American
democracy becoming a plutocracy through the private financing of political parties and the
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undermining of popular control that could result.42 Her work distinguished between those who
fund political parties and those who vote for them, foreshadowing the work of analysts who
argue that the private financing of U.S. elections corrupts the legislative process by pushing it
away from democratic principles.43 The government collects more data than ever before to
analyze the differences between donors and voters, and the prospects for dependence corruption.
Alas, these data are fraught with errors and difficult to ascertain.
Empirical agenda
For each pharmaceutical-industry donation, we must document who gave the money,
who received it, what effect was intended, and whether or not the intended effect was achieved.
We need to begin by refining the data that is already available. My research shows that current
data on political funding are incomplete. There is substantial evidence that the Federal Election
Commission (FEC) and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data on campaign donations
underestimate the actual spending by most industries due to reporting errors, omissions, and lack
of compliance with federal campaign finance reporting laws.44
At least some of this missing information can be recovered using new data-management
techniques. For example, Thomas Ferguson, statistician Jie Chen, and myself are combining the
campaign finance data collected by the FEC and the IRS and using name-matching techniques to
detect when multiple transactions reported under different names are actually donations by the
same donor. We are also applying industry codes so that when the same donor reports in one
transaction that he is the CEO of a pharmaceutical corporation and in another that he is retired,
these so-called retired donations can be attributed to the company. 45
These unattributed industry-tied donations add up. For example, when scholars
examined one of the few occasions on which the House of Representatives passed a bill that
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would limit industry profits—the Pharmaceutical Access Act of 2003 allowing drug reimportation—they concluded that donors listing their occupation as retired did not influence the
roll-call vote, even though the percentage of constituents over 65 in a Congressional district did
increase the probability of voting for the act. I suspect the reason why retired donors did not
influence the roll-call vote is because they were not retired, and in fact, worked for industries that
do not represent the interests of retirees.46
I also find, with Ferguson and Chen, donations by political action committees (PACs)
that have gone uncounted due to the complexity of reporting procedures and the rules about how
to identify a documented contribution. We found over $100 million dollars in unidentified PAC
contributions in the 2008 election cycle and over $73 million in 2012.47
Despite the limitations of the existing data, a variety of studies find the influence of
money on legislation. Scholars have found that (a) legislation passed by the Senate often
corresponds with the policy preferences of the wealthy, (b) members of Congress switched their
votes in the 1990s during the run-up to repealing the Glass-Steagall Act, which was a huge boon
to the financial services industry, (c) Congressional committee participation is more active (e.g.,
amendment proposals, asking questions, attendance) on issues of concern to campaign
contributors, (d) stock prices fluctuate based on a firm’s political donations (this finding is based
on an assumption that professional stock traders know the value of political favors when judging
a company’s profitability), and (e) fundraising distracts Congressional representatives from their
official duties and undermines public trust in Congress.
In addition to tracking the flow of money, we need to identify more precisely the links
between that money and public policy by studying how lobbying and other activities actually
work. Such research will help explain the mechanisms by which pharmaceutical corporations
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influence the legislative process so that Congress does not pursue policies that would alter patent
law, regulate drug prices, and restrict Big Pharma’s funding of continuing medical education and
other professional medical activities.48
One new approach is to view lobbying as a “form of legislative subsidy—a matching
grant of costly policy information, political intelligence, and labor to the enterprises of
strategically selected legislators.”49 Lobbyists contact sympathetic congressional members to
help them and their staffs do the hard work of research and bill writing. Campaign contributions,
too, are directed to the friendliest and most productive members of Congress. (Since it is very
difficult to change the mind of a determined politician, lobbying an unfriendly member of
Congress is often ineffective.) The campaign contribution maintains access by supplying muchneeded funds, while the lobbying reinforces the campaign contribution by supplying muchneeded information. To document how this process works for the pharmaceutical industry, we
need to establish the connection between campaign contributions and lobbying contacts,
demonstrate how lobbyists use information to attain favorable public policy, and show how a
member of Congress might depend on the information provided.
Political scientists Richard L. Hall and Robert P. Van Houweling demonstrate that
campaign contributions are associated with lobbying contacts, particularly contacts by those
lobbyists most influential in writing and passing the bill.50 Integrating such findings with a study
of how lobbyists use information to influence a bill should help explain why members of
Congress select some policy alternatives over others.
There are many different styles and types of policy analysis; each can frame issues in
different ways and provide different sorts of information.51 If lobbyists supply information to
help conduct policy analysis, what sorts of information do they provide? How is the information
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used? How does it frame policy options? Crucial elements of a policy design that use
information include how a problem is defined, the goals of the policy, the population targeted,
and the distribution of the policy’s costs and benefits.52 The study of how information is used
can help explain why certain policy alternatives are selected over others.53
Recent research has identified cases in which information was used in ways that conform
to dependence corruption. As one scholar noted, “policy analysts, policymakers, and observers
alike do not recognize policy analysis for what it is. Policy analysis has changed, right along
with the policy process, to become the provider of ideas and frames, to help sustain the discourse
that shapes citizens, preferences, and to provide the appearance of rationality [italics added].54
Scholars of dependence corruption therefore need to examine the possibilities for policy design
and ask what could have been and why alternative policies were not selected. This work should
be central to the study of pharmaceutical politics.
For generations, the pharmaceutical industry defined policy problems and reinforced
these definitions through campaign contributions. The pharmaceutical industry claimed it
needed high profits to have an incentive to invest in research, that price controls in other
countries amount to U.S. subsidizing the cost of drugs for other countries and that it is unsafe to
import drugs from other countries. 55 The industry has defined problems in a way that protected
profits while arguing that there was no conflict between profit maximization and public health.
But there is indeed much conflict.56 To uncover the details of how the pharmaceutical industry’s
definitions of pharmaceutical policy problems permeate legislative debates, we need to examine
the work of Congressional committees, the testimony at hearings, the work of lobbyists involved
in drafting bills, and industry campaign donations.
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Prospects for Change
We have seen that the opportunity to define the terms of a political policy debate is in
part a matter of having the right resources. For the last 50 years, the pharmaceutical industry—
alone among the interested parties—has had those resources and it has made full use of them.
Until there are enough alternative political resources to support alternative definitions of the
issues of pharmaceutical cost, effectiveness, and safety, it will be difficult for any political actors
to alter the policy design for pharmaceuticals.
There have been some hopeful signs at both the state and federal levels. In 2000, state
employees and senior citizens in Maine mobilized and the state used its purchasing power as
leverage to legislate a price control policy for pharmaceuticals.57 And as this essay goes to press,
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that federal regulators may bring antitrust suits against
pharmaceutical manufacturers when these firms pay generic producers to limit the supply of
generics.58
However, these glimmers of hope could be fleeting. Conditions are growing unfavorable
for efforts to enlarge the scope of political conflict through the mobilization of citizens. The
general decline in turnout, especially among the unemployed, the least educated, the poor, and
the young was lost in the celebratory headlines about voter-turnout in the 2012 federal election.59
The Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder (2013) abolishing the criteria in the
Voting Rights Act for subjecting electoral law in states and other electoral boundaries (Section 4)
to oversight by the Federal Department of Justice (DOJ), has already paved the way for states
formerly subject to the DOJ to pass strict voter identification laws and to seek early-voting and
registration limitations.60 When combined with the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v.
Marion County Election Board (2008) to uphold restrictive voter identification laws (even
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though in-person voting fraud does not exist), and the on-going court cases to limit early voting
and registration, the decline in turnout may accelerate.61 Simultaneously, federal court decisions
in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010) and Speechnow.org v. Federal
Election Commission (2010) helped to spawn a rise in the total amount of money pouring into
U.S. politics, and this rise is coming from an increasingly smaller faction of donors.62
Schattschneider’s scope of conflict seems to be shrinking rather than expanding. Political
scientist Walter Dean Burnham describes these trends as “the path to plutocracy.”63
We should remember Madison’s prediction in The Federalist about living in a large
republic:
Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it
less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights
of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who
feel it to discover their own strength and to act in unison with each other.64
Schattschneider’s insight was that we who are already citizens of a very large republic require
leadership and organization to find strength and commonality. It is a fact that political parties
have not mobilized American citizens to protect their own interests in the cost, effectiveness, and
safety of drugs. This failure is probably the intended result of political money, and is the insight
gleaned from following Ferguson’s Golden Rule: “To discover who rules, follow the gold.”65
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